ΡΙΜΟΟ

Your Global Investment Authority



Harley Bassman Executive Vice President Portfolio Manager

Mr. Bassman is an executive vice president and portfolio manager in the Newport Beach office, focusing on convexity products. Prior to joining PIMCO in 2014, he was a senior member of Credit Suisse's global rates business. Prior to that, he was with Merrill Lynch for 26 years in a variety of senior roles, including creating, marketing and trading a wide range of derivative and structured products. Mr. Bassman helped create the trademarked OPOSSMS and PRESERV mortgage risk management products and helped design the MOVE Index, the benchmark interest rate volatility gauge. Subsequently, he managed the firm's North American mortgage-backed securities and structured finance trading group and helped build the RateLab, the firm's full-spectrum U.S. rates trading desk strategy group. He has 31 years of investment experience and holds an MBA from the University of Chicago and a bachelor's degree in management science from the University of California, San Diego.



Viewpoint October 2014

Financial Market Cognitive Dissonance

In psychology, cognitive dissonance is the mental stress or discomfort caused by holding two or more contradictory beliefs at the same time, or from receiving new information conflicting with existing beliefs, ideas or values.

Presently, the financial markets are confronted with two conflicting pricing structures: a USD yield curve that anticipates a significant increase in interest rates over the medium term, and an options market that offers "rate insurance" at a historically low cost.

An investment conundrum ...

Woe to the investor who fails to heed the admonishment: "Don't fight the Fed."

And so it has been for the past five years that the Fed has implemented a grand scheme to *increase monetary velocity via financial repression (zero interest rate policy, or ZIRP, and asset substitution)* to create *inflation, depreciate nominal debt and delever both the public and private economies of the United States.*

Yet we have all seen this movie before; we know that the calm financial landscape the Fed has engineered will at some point become roiled. But let's be clear, this is not a dire prediction for calamity, in our view, it is just a notification that today's placid financial market will eventually return to a more normal risk profile.

A company of **Allianz** (1)

The yield curve appears to be fully awake to the possibility that the Fed could lift the heavy hand of financial repression – at least that is one interpretation of a stillsteep yield curve. While substantially flatter than its peak earlier this year, the current (as of 8 October) level of the benchmark two-year Treasury versus 10-year Treasury spread of 176 basis points (bps) is well above its 20-year average of 124 bps.

Yet this notice remains undelivered to the options market as the cost of interest rate insurance, quoted short-hand as the measure of implied volatility, is still near its "forever" low. Currently (as of 8 October) a three-month option on the 10-year swap rate sports an implied volatility of 69 bps versus its 20-year average of 105 bps. To apply some context to this statistical gibberish, an implied volatility at this level suggests a daily move of barely 4 bps. A more salient interpretation: Such a level of implied volatility creates a "break-even" range of less than +/– 16 bps for an entire month – a rather confounding number when one considers that the 10-year rate traversed 104 bps in two months during last year's Taper Tantrum.

Some may view the shape of the yield curve and the level of implied volatility as two independent and separate observations, but in fact they are historically well-linked. While it might be easy to rely upon charts and graphs to support this notion, instead I would like to present a heuristic parable as to why the linkage between these two risk vectors may soon revert toward their more normal relationship.

In Figure 1, the *eggplant line* is the yield spread between the two-year swap rate and the 10-year swap rate while the *avocado line* is the level of implied volatility for a threemonth expiry option on this same 10-year rate. While "conjoined twins" they are not, it is clear that these two risk vectors mostly have traversed a similar path over the past 20 years, at least until recently. While we might engage in a series of compounding differential equations to support this relationship, instead let's just apply some common sense.



FIGURE 1: IMPLIED VOLATILITY VERSUS YIELD CURVE

Source: Credit Suisse data through 8 October 2014

A forward rate is often described as the market's "prediction" of where interest rates will be at some given time in the future. Let me please dispel you of that notion: No one paced the corner of Wall Street and Broad (or the local Newport Beach Starbucks) taking a poll. A forward is simply the mathematical discounting of the spot curve to produce an "arbitrage free" price, no more, no less. That said, I will concede that the spot curve does contain meaningful information about how market participants value risk, and as such, there is significant value to be gained by analyzing the shape of the forward surface.

In a brief digression for those who are unfamiliar with the concepts of spot and forward rates, let's consider this hypothetical decision process. You have been entrusted with investing your mother's retirement funds. You can buy either a one-year CD at 2% or a two-year CD at 3%: Which do you choose? The action you take depends upon where you think you can purchase another one-year CD next year to make this an apples-to-apples comparison (so both investments have a two-year horizon). You would take the former investment only if you were confident the one-year "forward" CD could be purchased at 4% (or higher). (2% for the first year plus 4% for the second year is roughly equal to 3% for both years.) In broad strokes, this is the definition of a forward rate: It is the level of rates in the future that creates indifference today.

Back to our main point: When the spot curve is flat, the forward curve will also be flat at about the same level. However, when the spot curve gains some shape, forward rates will diverge from spot rates. The steeper (or more inverted) the yield curve, the greater the distance between the spot price and the forward price. Until Brian Greene can find a wormhole into the multiverse, time only can travel forward and the future must become the present. With no consideration as to whether the forward grinds to the spot or a spot price heads to its forward, a larger spread reasonably implies a greater uncertainty of the outcomes. And since implied volatility tends to be a function of uncertainty (risk), option prices tend to rise in conjunction with a steeper (or more inverted) yield curve.

The current situation is nearly the dictionary definition of cognitive dissonance: the discomfort experienced when one tries to hold two contradictory beliefs at the same time.

The yield curve is presently so steeply sloped that the oneyear rate is implied to double in six months and the twoyear rate seems slated to triple in two years. Even the less volatile five-year rate might be over 100 bps higher as spring turns to summer in 2016. Yet despite this uncertainty embedded into the yield curve, most measures of implied volatility are near their "forever" lows.

The *hemoglobin line* in Figure 2 is a cousin of the wellknown MOVE Index (the VIX of interest rates). Annotations show the events that locally drove volatility over the past 20 years; the current reading of 63 is extraordinarily low. Moreover, even a cursory glance would inform one that on the few times this index has breached 60, some sort of significant event has soon followed to pressure option prices higher.





Source: Credit Suisse data as of 8 October 2014

While anecdotal, this evidence suggests there is a limit as to how far the shape of the yield curve can diverge from the level of volatility. The *malibu line* in Figure 3 charts the ratio between the difference of the two-year rate today and one-year forward (often called the "carry") and the cost of a one-year option on the two-year rate.

A Wall Street aphorism for option traders describes the "three-to-one rule." Here, one measures the interest rate income embedded in the yield curve (the "carry") and compares this to the cost of an option of similar tenor. When this ratio reaches three to one, the trader should buy the option.

What is the source of this rule? Let's skip the math and just consider this as a game. Assume one has no opinion

as to whether the spot or forward price will be realized in the future. So if asked to weigh the odds of either outcome, the only rational ex ante guess is a "coin flip." Unless you can employ a trick coin, the fair payoff for a "flip" should be two to one. As such, it is completely anomalous that one could buy an option for one dollar that will pay out three dollars if the rate structure remains unchanged (forwards accrete to spot). In essence, one is being offered a three-to-one payoff for a two-to-one risk. *The option price is simply too low for the risk embedded in the yield curve.* It is this notion that underpins the usually tight correlation between the yield curve and implied volatility, and why payoff ratios tend to remain below two to one.





Source: Credit Suisse data as of 8 October 2014, showing ratio between the difference of the two-year rate today and one-year forward and the cost of a one-year option on the two-year rate.

As much as it distracts from a good story, the fact of the matter is that it is never "different this time." Risk and return are tightly linked except for those rare periods when investor emotion overwhelms financial concentration. While one could justify the present yield curve/volatility dynamic as a manifestation of the Fed's efforts at "guidance," I would retort that while it may be possible to land a jumbo jet onto a football field, it is still highly unlikely.

While we can debate when the journey to the terminal federal funds rate will begin, what may be more certain is that the divergence between the yield curve and implied volatility will dissolve. Markets may appear confounded by cognitive dissonance, but forward-looking investors can peer through the fog: A return to a more recognizable risk/return profile, even if market returns are lower overall (as may well be the case over the secular horizon), could help investors more confidently align longer-term objectives with strategies.

Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. Investing in the bond market is

subject to risks, including market, interest rate, issuer, credit, inflation risk, and liquidity risk. The value of most bonds and bond strategies are impacted by changes in interest rates. Bonds and bond strategies with longer durations tend to be more sensitive and volatile than those with shorter durations; bond prices generally fall as interest rates rise, and the current low interest rate environment increases this risk. Current reductions in bond counterparty capacity may contribute to decreased market liquidity and increased price volatility. Bond investments may be worth more or less than the original cost when redeemed. **Equities** may decline in value due to both real and perceived general market, economic and industry conditions. **Derivatives** may involve certain costs and risks, such as liquidity, interest rate, market, credit, management and the risk that a position could not be closed when most advantageous. Investing in derivatives could lose more than the amount invested.

Statements concerning financial market trends or portfolio strategies are based on current market conditions, which will fluctuate. There is no guarantee that these investment strategies will work under all market conditions or are suitable for all investors and each investor should evaluate their ability to invest for the long term, especially during periods of downturn in the market. Outlook and strategies are subject to change without notice. Hypothetical and simulated examples have many inherent limitations and are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. There are frequently sharp differences between simulated results and the actual results. There are numerous factors related to the markets in general or the implementation of any specific investment strategy, which cannot be fully accounted for in the preparation of simulated results and all of which can adversely affect actual results. No guarantee is being made that the stated results will be achieved. It is not possible to invest directly in an unmanaged index.

This material contains the current opinions of the author but not necessarily those of PIMCO and such opinions are subject to change without notice. This material is distributed for informational purposes only and should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.

PIMCO provides services only to qualified institutions and investors. This is not an offer to any person in any jurisdiction where unlawful or unauthorized. | Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, 650 Newport Center Drive, Newport Beach, CA 92660 is regulated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. | PIMCO Europe Ltd (Company No. 2604517), PIMCO Europe, Ltd Amsterdam Branch (Company No. 24319743), and PIMCO Europe Ltd - Italy (Company No. 07533910969) are authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (25 The North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, London E14 5HS) in the UK. The Amsterdam and Italy Branches are additionally regulated by the AFM and CONSOB in accordance with Article 27 of the Italian Consolidated Financial Act, respectively. PIMCO Europe Ltd services and products are available only to professional clients as defined in the Financial Conduct Authority's Handbook and are not available to individual investors, who should not rely on this communication. | PIMCO Deutschland GmbH (Company No. 192083, Seidlstr. 24-24a, 80335 Munich, Germany) is authorised and regulated by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (Marie- Curie-Str. 24-28, 60439 Frankfurt am Main) in Germany in accordance with Section 32 of the German Banking Act (KWG). The services and products provided by PIMCO Deutschland GmbH are available only to professional clients as defined in Section 31a para. 2 German Securities Trading Act (WpHG). They are not available to individual investors, who should not rely on this communication. | PIMCO Asia Pte Ltd (501 Orchard Road #09-03, Wheelock Place, Singapore 238880, Registration No. 199804652K) is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore as a holder of a capital markets services licence and an exempt financial adviser. The asset management services and investment products are not available to persons where provision of such services and products is unauthorised. | PIMCO Asia Limited (Suite 2201, 22nd Floor, Two International Finance Centre, No. 8 Finance Street, Central, Hong Kong) is licensed by the Securities and Futures Commission for Types 1, 4 and 9 regulated activities under the Securities and Futures Ordinance. The asset management services and investment products are not available to persons where provision of such services and products is unauthorised. | PIMCO Australia Pty Ltd (Level 19, 363 George Street, Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia), AFSL 246862 and ABN 54084280508, offers services to wholesale clients as defined in the Corporations Act 2001. | PIMCO Japan Ltd (Toranomon Towers Office 18F, 4-1-28, Toranomon, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan 105-0001) Financial Instruments Business Registration Number is Director of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Financial Instruments Firm) No.382. PIMCO Japan Ltd is a member of Japan Investment Advisers Association and The Investment Trusts Association, Japan. Investment management products and services offered by PIMCO Japan Ltd are offered only to persons within its respective jurisdiction, and are not available to persons where provision of such products or services is unauthorized. Valuations of assets will fluctuate based upon prices of securities and values of derivative transactions in the portfolio, market conditions, interest rates, and credit risk, among others. Investments in foreign currency denominated assets will be affected by foreign exchange rates. There is no guarantee that the principal amount of the investment will be preserved, or that a certain return will be realized; the investment could suffer a loss. All profits and losses incur to the investor. The amounts, maximum amounts and calculation methodologies of each type of fee and expense and their total amounts will vary depending on the investment strategy, the status of investment performance, period of management and outstanding balance of assets and thus such fees and expenses cannot be set forth herein. | PIMCO Canada Corp. (199 Bay Street, Suite 2050, Commerce Court Station, P.O. Box 363, Toronto, ON, M5L 1G2) services and products may only be available in certain provinces or territories of Canada and only through dealers authorized for that purpose. | PIMCO Latin America Edifício Internacional Rio Praia do Flamengo, 154 1º andar, Rio de Janeiro – RJ Brasil 22210-906. | No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission. PIMCO and YOUR GLOBAL INVESTMENT AUTHORITY are trademarks or registered trademarks of Allianz Asset Management of America L.P. and Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, respectively, in the United States and throughout the world. © 2014, PIMCO.

Newport Beach Headquarters 650 Newport Center Drive Newport Beach, CA 92660 +1 949.720.6000

Amsterdam

Hong Kong

London

Milan

Munich

New York

Rio de Janeiro

Singapore

Sydney

Tokyo

Toronto

Zurich

pimco.com

PIMCO